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EYES ONLY

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EVALUATION OF DOCUMENTS ON ALGERIAN
APPROACH TO US

- I. A group of Algerian nationalists, members of the UDMA
(Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien), made a bid for
US aid in early February along these lines:
- A. Desire \$11,000,000 in aid for the first year for finan-
cial payments to their fighters, aid to their families and
propaganda, agents' travel etc.
- B. Also want 3,500 bazookas
30,000 "machine rifles"
50,000 machine guns
mortars, plastic explosive grenades, binoculars,
compasses, long-range radio sets
- C. Claim Soviet Embassy, Paris, offered 30 year loan
\$4,575,000, half in cash and half in arms "with no strings
attached." Claim offer was neither accepted nor rejected.
- D. Claim they are desperate for aid from any source, but
prefer aid from the US rather than the USSR. Believe
acceptance of Soviet aid would mean take-over by Communists.


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E. Claimed that acceptance of Egyptian aid does not mean they are fighting for independence merely to become a subject of Egypt.

II. OCI Evaluation:

A. The UDMA is ²small, generally moderate, nationalist party which has never been influential. It is made up largely of intellectuals. Its leaders have at times collaborated with the Algerian Communist Party. The party has been used intermittently by the French as a divisive force in Algerian nationalism.



B. The UDMA has generally been "frozen out" of the chief nationalist movement, ~~of~~ the Algerian National Liberation Front and its Army as French "collaborators."

C. Some of the statements made by the UDMA leaders during their approach to American representatives were untrue.

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D. The UDMA approach may be an attempt, by obtaining either American or Soviet assistance, to gain an "in" with the existing rebel leadership. It is possible, in view of UDMA leftist contacts, that it has received a Soviet aid offer as alleged.

- TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP

- I. "Election" of Soviet party leaders (to Presidium and Secretariat) confirms that "collective leadership" principle continues.
 - A. No changes made in eleven top slots-- "full members" of Presidium (former "Politburo").
 - B. However, five new "candidate members" of Presidium chosen; number of "candidates" upped from two to six:
 1. Marshal Zhukov--the first professional army officer to reach this political level. Indicates party leaders' increased interest in military viewpoint.
 2. Mukhitdinov--new and surprisingly young face: 39-year-old party boss and cotton expert in Uzbek S.S.R. (Central Asia). Probably a Khrushchev protege. *Moslem Asian*

3. Bezhnev--top party man in another Central Asian Republic--Kazakhstan--heart of the "new lands" area.
4. Shepilov--member of party Secretariat and chief editor of Pravda. Travelled with Khrushchev to China, and Yugoslavia during 1954-1955, and instrumental in setting up arms deal with Egypt. Considered a "comer."
5. Madame Furtseva--46-year-old Moscow party boss and graduate chemical engineer: first woman ever to reach this high office. Moscow party organization since 1942: her husband (N.D. Firyubin) is Ambassador to Yugoslavia. She has been noted as dancing-partner of Khrushchev at Kremlin receptions.

6. Sixth "candidate member"--Shvernik--
is only hold-over. Has been head of
the trade unions since Stalin's death.
- C. Only "candidate" casualty was P. K.
Ponomarenkov, currently Ambassador to
Poland.

II. Party Secretariat, under First Secretary
Khrushchev, was also expanded (from six to
eight), with New Presidium "candidates"
Brezhnev and Madam Furtseva getting the two
new slots.

A. Thus, Khrushchev's control over Secre-
tariat seems well solidified.

III. Party Congress also "elected" new 255-man
Central Committee (up 18 from former size).

A. Khrushchev's predominant position further
underscored by large number of his
proteges who made the grade.

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- B. However, other top leaders (Mikoyan, Bulganin, and Kaganovich) also have liberal sprinkling their supporters on Central Committee.
- C. Some decrease noted in representation by army and police. The 14 slots released by this cut-back went to other office-holders in government bureaucracy.

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ELY IN: GUILLAUME OUT

- I. Gen. Paul Ely, 58, has replaced Gen. Guillaume as President of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. This is second time he has held post, which is top French military job. His background:
 - A. French rep to Standing Group of NATO military committee in Washington ('51) President of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee ('53); Commissioner General and C in C in Indochina after fall of Dien Bien Phu ('54-'55);
 - B. Protege of late General De Lattre, pro-NATO and known as hard-working intelligent, quiet, and non-committal.
 - C. Has lame right arm and, in '54 and early '55, was considered a "very sick man."

1. While in Indochina, was convinced champion of French position that Diem inadequate and a "National Union" government (of sects and parties) preferable in South Vietnam.
2. His views on North Africa unknown.

II In contrast, Gen. Augustin Guillaume, a onetime Resident General in Morocco ('51), played key role in '53 deposition of Sultan Mohamed ben Youseff.

- A. Guillaume tends to be anti-American, and is identified with "strong policy" in North Africa (as advocated by French settlers and right-wing opinion in France).
- B. Unconfirmed report of Feb '56 characterizes him as member of group of French generals organized to "prevent further deterioration of French

BACKGROUND--GREEK ELECTORAL SYSTEM

- I. Anomaly of 163 of 300 seats being won with 46% of popular vote stems from new Greek electoral law, specially passed in Dec '55 to cover latest election.
 - A. Previous law (which worked on a "plurality takes all" basis) gave Papagos' Rally 239 out of 300 seats with 49% of popular vote. ('52).
 - B. Present law was framed because it was apparent that nobody could repeat this performance.
 - C. Law aims at penalizing small splinters (any party that fails to poll at least 15% of national vote is out), but rewarding coalitions (groups of parties, working together, need only poll 25% of national vote to achieve representation).

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II. Mechanics of law divide Greece's 41 electoral districts into following four groups: the ten districts that elect between 1 and 3 deputies; the sixteen districts that elect 4 to 6; the eleven that elect 7 to 9; and the four urban areas (Athens, Salonika, Larissa and Piraeus) that elect 11 or more deputies.

- A. In the 1 to 3 deputy districts, plurality winner gets all seats.
- B. In the 4 to 6 deputy districts, plurality winner gets all seats but one, which is awarded to second-place winner (providing this second-place party /or coalition/ has made its quota of 15% /or 25%/ of both district and national vote).
 - 1. If quota not made, seat reverts to plurality winner.

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- C. In the 7 to 9 deputy districts, plurality winner gets all seats but two, both of which go to second runner (assuming quota made).
- D. In the four urban districts, however, seats go by direct proportional representation (again assuming that rear runners have made their national and local quotas).
 - 1. Example: Markezinis' party got only 2.2% of national vote, and was counted out.

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BACKGROUND--USSR-CANADIAN TRADE AGREEMENT

- I. Soviet-Canadian trade agreement (signed 29 Feb in Ottawa) calls for USSR to purchase some \$45 million worth of Canadian wheat (400,000 tons a year for the next three years).
 - A. Under agreement Canada, in turn, will give "most-favoured-nation" tariff treatment to Soviet imports, but does not guarantee to import any fixed value of Soviet goods.
 - B. Moscow, however, has offered the bait of possible additional wheat purchases if Canada should accept substantial imports from the USSR.
- II. Canadians will find agreement helpful in disposing of some of their 30 million ton wheat surplus.

A. Previous Canadian trade with the Soviet Union has been small.

(Example: exports to USSR in '54 were valued at \$4 million).

B. Canadians made almost no concessions during 5-month-long negotiations, and successfully refused to accept additional Russian commercial representatives and consular officials.

III. Soviet purchase (which amounts to 1% of their own annual production) may reflect bad crop in Moscow's "New Lands" area last year.

A. As contrast, USSR during past three years has exported 2% of its own wheat harvest to the Free World.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION

- I. Election of National Assembly next Sunday (4 March) will climax long-drawn-out government preparations to construct popular base under Premier Diem's regime.
 - A. 123 men to be elected: first task-- approval of a Diem-drafted constitution
 - B. Draft (still unpublished) reportedly grants overriding authority to executive--including power to dissolve Assembly in cases of "serious conflict with the government."
- II. Delay in Assembly election has been used by Diem both to organize new political parties (committed to his support), and to hamstring opposition.
 - A. Opposition groups, in protest over restrictive election regulations, have refused to enter their own lists of candidates.

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1. Some individual opposition members have filed as independents, however.

B. Apparently as a warning, Diem recently arrested, later released Phan Huy Dan, one of most vocal of opposition.

C. Press censorship theoretically lifted but heavy fines and imprisonment decreed for publication of material "designed to favor Communist or other anti-national activities."

III. Meanwhile, South Vietnam government has reduced internal rebellion to lowest ~~LEVEL~~ yet achieved.

A. Recent negotiated surrender of one of two remaining Hoa Hao rebel commanders (with over 1,000 troops) is important psychological victory for Diem.

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B. Simultaneously, Vietnamese army has moved into Cao Dai territory, thus eliminating armed threat from that quarter.

IV. Viet Minh violently attacking Diem's election plan.

A. Hanoi has stated "Vietnamese people" will "transform elections into bloody reply to Americans and their lackeys," called for "massive boycott" of election.

B. At same time, Viet Minh conceding that Diem will undoubtedly win at polls, as was case in "Bao Dai referendum farce."

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V. [REDACTED] has just reported on Viet Minh "plan of action" for election day, being circulated to cadres in South by word-of-mouth.

- A. Plan to keep down turn-out by spreading rumors of riots; also by posing as government functionaries advising voters to wait for a car to take them to polls.
 - B. Also plan to send gangs of indoctrinated youths to polls, steal ballot boxes.
- VI. Probable that Viet Minh will use every means short of overt, traceable interference to disrupt polling.
- A. However, doubt that full Viet Minh capabilities for terrorism and sabotage will be employed, since appearance of scrupulous compliance with Geneva terms is important to Viet Minh from world propaganda standpoint.

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- B. Communist line is that South, by its "unilateral elections" and refusal to consult on nationwide elections, is causing breakdown of Geneva accord.
- C. Thus, Communists claim, new international conference is required.

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POST-ELECTION GREECE

I. Prime Minister Karamanlis' election squeak-through (19 Feb) gives him narrow majority control of new parliament. However, number of seats won by leftist candidates means that new parliament will also be scene of Communist-inspired activities.

A. Although it polled only 46% of popular vote, Karamanlis' own party, the "National Radical Union" (ERE), won 163 of total 300 seats.

B. "Popular Front" coalition of Center and Left Parties, temporarily established for election campaign purposes, got 54% of popular vote.

1. However, "Front" has now dissolved, and leaders of Center parties (with about 84 seats) have announced support for

Karamanlis on foreign policy.

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2. Same cannot be said for domestic issues, where Center parties will seek to embarrass government, promote new elections.

II. Successes by the Left Parties of the "Front", in turn, have given Communist-influenced groups largest bloc ever in parliament (44 seats).

- A. Communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA) got 18 seats; fellow-travelling Democratic Party (DKEL) 20; Democratic Initiative Movement, 6.
- B. For first time since 1947, Communists have gained parliamentary cloak of respectability, forum from which to harrass government.

III. Makeup of new cabinet (announced 29 Feb and containing first woman in Greek history) ^{HARDLY} supports Karamanlis' announced intention to tackle Greece's pressing

domestic and foreign problems. However,
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Karamanlis anticipates his own fall in about six months, because:

- A. Any hard-hitting program of social reform will antagonize powerful vested interests, who could cause defection of enough ERE deputies (14 would be sufficient) to bring down Government.
- B. At same time, Karamanlis believes that failure to push reforms would also bring him down.
- C. Says he will go down fighting, probably in hope his record will attract greater popular support in next elections.

IV. Narrow margin of ERE victory (old Rally, for example, had 239 seats) guarantees pressure for new recourse to polls.

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- A. New government will almost certainly fall well before completion of statutory four-year term: perhaps in 6 to 18 months.
- B. Thus, Greek political activity in immediate future will probably be geared to building record for use in next campaign.

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BACKGROUND--CYPRUS AND TURKEY

- I. Question of self-determination for Cyprus will remain important factor in Greek politics, even though provisional settlement may soon be reached with UK.
 - A. Because of nationalist emotion involved, any Greek government will have to support Cypriote aspirations.
 - B. Prime Minister Karamanlis will thus continue to support efforts of Archbishop Makarios, although Karamanlis almost certainly desires temporary settlement of issue, so he can devote his attention to Greece's domestic problems.
- II. Turkish parliament approved (29 Feb) payments (not to exceed \$30 million) for victims of anti-Greek riots of Sep '55.

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- A. Action removes a principal obstacle to renewed Greek-Turkish co-operation in NATO and Balkan alliance.
- B. Karamanlis will thus gain a little more freedom of action in dealing with Greece's international problems.
- C. However, relations with Turkey will probably continue somewhat strained.

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BACKGROUND--INDONESIA

A. Tentative Line-Up of Parties

1.	<u>National Party (PNI)</u>	57
	<u>Pantjasila (merged)</u>	2
		59
	PRN	2
	Labor	2
	PRI	2
	PRIM	1
	Desa	1
	PIR	1
	Permai	1
		10
	<u>PNI & Supporting Parties:</u>	10
		69
2.	<u>Masjumi</u>	57
	<u>AKUI (merged)</u>	1
		58
	Christian	8
	Catholic	6
	Socialist	5
	IPKI (army)	4
	PPTI	1
	PIR	1
		25
	<u>Masj & Supporting Parties:</u>	25
		83
3.	<u>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</u>	45
	<u>PSII</u>	8
	<u>PERTI</u>	4
		57
4.	<u>Communist Party (PKI)</u>	39
	Murba	2
	AKOMA	1

5. Minors of Unknown Alignment

Police	2
Sudjono	1
Baperki	1
Gerinda	1
Dayak	1
	<u>6</u>

B. Parliamentary Breakdown by major parties
(elected seats)

National Party	59
Masjumi	58
Nahdlatul Ulama	45
Communist Party	39
All Others	56
TOTAL	257

ALGERIAN CRISIS

- I. Crisis of major proportions approaching with "frightening acceleration" in Algeria, according to US ConGen Clark.
 - A. Rebel operations (commenced 1 Nov '54 in isolated mountainous area eastern Algeria--see map) have now left few sections of country untouched. As measure of intensity, in Jan '56, rebels killed 211 persons (59 military).
 - B. Rebel attacks thusfar in '56 are bolder, better conceived, on increasingly larger scale.
 - C. French officials in Paris and Algiers anticipate major rebel action during March.
 - D. Rebel strength now estimated at 20,000 (by French) to 40,000 (by moderate Algerians)--this is 4 to 8

- E. A few small-arms shipments smuggled in, but majority of rebel weapons captured from French.
 - F. Past French claims of Communist involvement in rebel movement (not substantiated by US intelligence) being reiterated, on basis "new proof". However, we have not been shown evidence.
 - 1. French also speak of role played by native ex-soldiers, captured and "indoctrinated" at Dien Bien Phu.
 - 2. This claim made specifically about only one man--a rebel leader in neighboring Morocco.
- II. ConGen reports rebels have so harassed Algerian land communications that only reasonably safe means of travel by air or sea.

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- A. In past week, small but important seaport of Nemours (map), sole outlet for important mines in eastern Morocco and western Algeria, isolated except by sea.
 - B. Small former pirate port of Collo (eastern Algeria), has been similarly isolated for several months.
 - C. ConGen claims evidence that, at some strategic moment, rebels plan to surround city of Algiers (pop: over 1/4 million): ~~which~~ ^{Action} might include uprising within city.
 - 1. City's mayor, meanwhile, believes local police not equipped to handle even present situation.
- III. ConGen further reports that European settlers--who rioted wildly on occasion Premier Mollet's visit (6 Feb)--fear France will abandon them.

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- A. "Colons" are organizing for self-defense; if necessary, will defy French law.
 - B. Talk has revived about forming European-supremacy regime on pattern South Africa.
 - C. Several press accounts suggest Europeans attempting to confiscate military and police arms-stores.
- IV. In striking nation-wide address (28 Feb), Premier Mollet has issued sugar-coated ultimatum to Algerian Moslems.
- A. Demanded end to fighting and "acts of violence"; declared "arms must be laid down".
 - B. Promised, in turn, that within three months of restoration of peace, "free and genuine elections will be organized".

C. Closed on stern note that Moslems' rejection of appeal would force France "to mobilize all its resources in order to assure by all means the security of the population."

V. On 29 Feb, Mollet asked National Assembly grant "special powers" to Minister Lacoste in Algeria to carry out Government's program.

A. Two-pronged Government plan first envisions large-scale military reinforcement, for restoration of order.

B. Thereafter, plan calls for economic and social "progress", administrative "reform", aimed at bettering Moslems' lot.

VI. Present military and security forces-- now about 200,000 (G-2 conservatively estimates 160,000 army as of 29 Feb 56)--

A. Lacoste has asked for 50,000 reinforcements immediately, another 50,000 later.

B. French taking serious view of recent defections of native Algerian troops to rebels.

1. Lacoste reportedly has also asked immediate replacement of 45,000 (NORTH AFRICAN) (TROOPS) ~~native Algerians~~ by 35,000 from metropole.

C. Defense Ministry plans to regroup, re-train forces in Algeria, the better to combat rebels' hit-and-run operations.

1. This would involve break-up of NATO-committed units transferred during past year to Algeria.

BACKGROUND: ALGERIAN MILITARY TACTICS

- I. Details on the deployment of French forces are scanty.
- II. To combat rebel guerrilla operations, the French are engaging in limited offensive measures with punitive forces of company, battalion and perhaps regimental size.
 - A. Only about 25,000 troops (15%) are reportedly involved in these operations.
 - B. The remaining 85% of French forces are deployed defensively. These defensive forces are allegedly able to converge speedily on threatened or attacked localities, thus maintaining or regaining control.
 - C. This works by day, but at night the French withdraw ^{to} their strong points and the countryside is open to guerilla activity.

POPULATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

ALGERIA (1954)

Moslems	Europeans & Jews	Total
8,450,000	1,030,000	9,480,000

FRENCH MOROCCO (1953)

8,000,000	495,000	8,495,000
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TUNISIA (1955)

3,454,000	346,000	3,800,000
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(NOTE: Approximately 50 percent of the
Moslem population is less than 20
years of age.)